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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Petitioner-Appellee, 
v. 
ARVIN MOORE, 
Respondent-Appellant. 
Case No. 20100202-SC 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction on the grant of a writ of certiorari under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-3-102(a). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
In the order dated June 10, 2010, this Court granted certiorari on the following 
question: "Whether the court of appeals erred in reversing Respondent's conviction for 
dealing in material harmful to a minor." 
The State set forth the following two questions in support of its claim that the court 
of appeals erred: 
A. Did the court of appeals improperly convert the alleged date of the crime into an 
element that had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, in contravention of this Court's 
well-established precedent that time is not an element of the offense? 
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B. Did the court of appeals improperly hold that the State could not have amended the 
information to conform to Defendant's evidence, in contravention of this Court's well-
established precedent that, absent prejudice to Defendant, the State may amend its 
information up until the verdict? 
For the reasons set forth herein, Respondent proposes that the proper question 
presented is: 
Did the court of appeals err when it concluded, based upon the State's concession 
trial counsel provided deficient performance, that there was a reasonable probability of a 
different result on the charge of providing harmful material to a minor given the specific 
facts elicited at trial? 
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the district court, for correctness. State v. Brake, 2004 Ut 95, f^ 11, 103 P.3d 
699. On questions of ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court reviews for correctness 
the appellate court's application of the law to the facts and that court's findings of fact 
under the clearly erroneous standard. Menzies v. Galetka, 2006 UT 81, U 58, 150 P.3d 
480. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution: "In all criminal proceedings, 
the accused shall enjoy the . . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent agrees with the Statement of the Case set forth in Petitioner's Brief. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Trial Testimony 
Lance, who was 18 years old at the time of trial, testified that he told his mother he 
had an addiction to pornography and looked at it "whenever he got a chance." (R. 370: 
90.) Lance claimed he was first introduced to pornography by Arvin Moore. (R. 370: 91.) 
Lance testified he began working for Mr. Moore in 2001 when Lance was twelve 
years old. (R. 370: 99.) In 2002, he worked on Mr. Moore's farm during the summer; 
Lance hauled hay, built fences and chased cows. (R. 370: 102.) A number of other kids 
also worked on the farm during the summers. Lance testified he worked on the farm in 
2002 and 2003, when he was fourteen. (R. 370: 131.) 
Lance testified that in the summer of 2002 when he was thirteen years old, while he 
was in an upstairs room at the Moore ranch watching a movie which showed men 
masturbating, he began to masturbate. Lance testified Mr. Moore entered the room when 
Lance was watching the movie, reached around Lance and touched Lance's penis. (R. 
370: 122.) 
The defense called a number of witnesses who testified about their contact with Mr. 
Moore and about the farm during the summer of 2002. Arlene O'Driscoll, Mr. Moore's 
sister, lived in Evanston, Wyoming, but was caring for her dying mother at the Moore 
ranch during the summer of 2002. (R. 370: 171.) Except for a few days when her mother 
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was in the hospital between July 21 and 24, 2002, Arlene and her sisters were at the home 
seven days a week all summer until their mother died on August 2, 2002. (R. 370: 176.) 
While at the house, she never saw any sexual materials or videos there. (R. 370: 181, 
185.) The upstairs bedroom did not have a television that summer. After her mother's 
death, the family did not remove their mother's possessions until March 2003, and the 
upstairs room was not cleaned until after that time. (R. 370: 176.) In 2002, Mr. Moore's 
bedroom was downstairs. (R. 370: 88, 178.) 
Doris Prettyman, another of Mr. Moore's sisters, testified that she stayed with her 
mother 24 hours a day on the days she cared for her in 2002. (R. 370: 195-96.) No boys 
came into the house while she was there that summer. The upstairs room was her parents' 
bedroom, and it had a bed and dresser but no television set that summer. (R. 370: 202-03.) 
A third sister, Ileane Taylor, testified about caring for her mother the summer of 
2002. While she was there, the only televisions in the house were a large console in the 
living room and a small one in Mr. Moore's downstairs bedroom. (R. 370: 222.) 
Molly Ladd lived at the Moore ranch during the summer of 2002. Before Mr. 
Moore's mother's death, Mr. Moore and Ms. Ladd ate lunch inside the house, and none of 
the ranch hands ate with them. (R. 370: 233.) After his mother's death, Ms. Ladd would 
fix lunch for some of the ranch hands inside the house. After lunch they would all go back 
to work. (R. 370: 234.) She testified that during the summer of 2002 there was no 
television in the upstairs bedroom. (R. 370: 236.) 
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Two ranch hands, Brandon John and Nash Jones testified that they never saw Mr. 
Moore inappropriately touch Lance or any other worker at the ranch. John worked at the 
ranch when he was 15 or 16 years old. 
Jones never went inside to eat while Mr. Moore's mother was there the summer of 
2002. After she died, the ranch hands would go inside for the lunch which Ladd prepared. 
(R. 370: 250.) He never saw Mr. Moore say anything inappropriate to Lance or touch 
Lance. (R. 370: 250.) 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Evidence at Motion for New Trial 
Contrary to his testimony at trial, in the initial interview with the police, which is 
preserved on DVD, Lance told the police he was touched by Mr. Moore when Lance was 
fourteen years old. (R. 355-363: Exhibit A attached to motion for new trial, DVD of 
interview.) During that interview, he repeated his age on the date of the offense at least 
four times and never wavered from stating he was fourteen when this happened. The 
police report reflects that Lance told the police he was fourteen. (R. 563: Exhibit B 
attached to motion for new trial, a copy of the police report of the interview.) For the first 
time, in an unrecorded conversation with the police which occurred days after the initial 
interview, Lance allegedly said he was thirteen at the time of the touching. 
C. The Court of Appeals Opinion 
On appeal, the State conceded that trial counsel had provided deficient performance 
by not raising the issue of the significant discrepancy in the testimony of Lance concerning 
the alleged incident at the ranch and that Moore was entitled to a new trial on Count One. 
5 
However, the State argued that there was no prejudice as to the display of harmful 
materials charge. 
Applying the proper standards for review of constitutional claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the court of appeals rejected the State's argument as to Count Two: 
We agree that the prejudice as to the sexual abuse charge is of a different 
character than that of the dealing in harmful material charge because the 
victim's age—being younger than fourteen—is an element of the offense 
itself. Nonetheless, trial counsel's deficient performance in failing to present 
evidence and argument as to the unreliability of the fact that the abuse 
occurred when the victim was thirteen was prejudicial as to both charges. 
The State argued at trial that both the sexual abuse and the dealing in 
harmful material occurred sometime in July or August of 2002, which was 
consistent with the Information, and the jury was instructed that a conviction 
required finding that the crime occurred "[o]n or about the date charged in 
the Information." Thus, the inconsistent evidence regarding whether it was 
the summer of 2002 or 2003 when the charged conduct occurred makes all 
the difference under these circumstances. If the victim was thirteen at the 
time of the conduct, as the victim testified at trial, then the events would 
have occurred in the time frame alleged by the State. However, if the victim 
was fourteen at the time the events occurred, as he initially reported and as 
other testimony at trial suggested, then the conduct would have necessarily 
occurred in the summer of 2003 as opposed to in the time frame alleged by 
the State. Thus, under the instructions presented to the jury, if there was a 
reasonable doubt as to whether the charged conduct occurred in 2002, the 
jury would have been obligated to acquit Moore. Cf. State v. Fulton, 742 
P.2d 1208, 1216 (Utah 1987) (stating that dates within one day of the date 
charged were "acceptably close" and that therefore there was no 
"constitutionally fatal variance between the charges and the p roof ) . Under 
these circumstances, we think there is a reasonable probability that if 
Moore's trial counsel would have highlighted the inconsistencies regarding 
the age of the victim and, likewise, the summer when the charged conduct 
may actually have occurred, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt as 
to whether the conduct occurred in 2002. 
State v. Moore, 2009 UT App 386, \ 10 (footnotes omitted). 
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The court of appeal also rejected the State's argument that the jury could have 
based the verdict on other acts which occurred on or about the dates alleged: 
The State argues that even if the viewing of the video tape, which happened 
in tandem with the sexual abuse, occurred in 2003, there existed other 
evidence and arguments it could have presented to support the charge of 
dealing in material harmful to a minor in 2002. But the State did not present 
such evidence at trial and essentially admitted at oral argument that it relied 
solely on the video tape for the dealing in harmful material charge. In such a 
situation, we cannot simply assume that other information not presented 
would have led the jury to the same conclusion, even if that information was 
mentioned in passing at trial. On remand, the State will have the opportunity 
to present any and all supporting evidence and argue that Moore dealt in 
various materials harmful to a minor. 
Id. at T| 11 (footnote omitted). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals decision should be affirmed as it applied the correct standard 
of review in reversing Mr. Moore's conviction for dealing in material harmful to a minor. 
The State conceded that trial counsel's performance was deficient. Regarding prejudice 
caused by that deficiency, the decision found there was a reasonable probability of a 
different result as the trial was unreliable and unfair. 
The decision did not contravene prior precedents of the Utah appellate courts. The 
decision recognized that time was not an "element" of the offense; however, it determined 
under the facts of this case, that there existed a reasonable probability of a different result 
had trial counsel elicited the inconsistencies in the complaining witness's testimony 
regarding when the alleged acts occurred. The State erroneously requests this Court 
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decide this matter under cases which apply the sufficiency of the evidence standard of 
review, rather than the reasonable probability of a different result standard. 
The State ignores the impact of trial counsel's request for a bill of particulars and 
the State's response; under these circumstances, this Court has held that the presentation of 
facts outside that time frame will require reversal. Additionally, this Court has found that 
a mid-trial change in the dates alleged may require reversal under principles of due 
process. 
In the trial court, the State did not seek a variance or present evidence on the 
motion for new trial that it would have sought a variance. The dicta in the court of appeals 
decision is not essential to its reversal of the conviction; since it is unclear what action the 
State would have taken in regard to the omissions of trial counsel, this Court need not 
speculate on whether a variance would have been granted, if even requested. Assuming, 
arguendo, this Court reaches the variance question, the State fails to cite any case in which 
a mid-trial variance of one year has been sought or upheld. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS A 
REASONABLE PROBABILITY OF A DIFFERENT RESULT ON COUNT TWO 
GIVEN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE 
The court of appeals decision should not be reversed. Its finding that Respondent 
was prejudiced from the deficient performance of his trial counsel is consistent with the 
prior precedent of this Court in that the decision did not transform the date of the alleged 
offense into an element of the offense, and it did not determine that the State "could not 
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have amended the information" as asserted by Petitioner (Petitioner's Opening Brief on 
Certiorari, hereinafter "POB" at 2 ) Rather the court of appeals decision properly held that 
the acts and omissions of trial counsel undermined its confidence in the outcome of the 
trial since there was a reasonable probability of a different result, such that Respondent is 
entitled to a new trial on this charge Strickland v Washington, 466 U S 668, 694-695 
(1984) 
Following the State's concession on appeal that trial counsel's performance was 
deficient1, the court of appeals properly focused solely on the question of whether 
Respondent was prejudiced as to the harmful material conviction 
The court of appeals began with an acknowledgment of the proper standards for 
reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Moore, 2009 UT App 386 at ^ 8, 
and the State has not argued that the court of appeals applied an incorrect standard of 
review 
A defendant claiming prejudice from the ineffective assistance of counsel need not 
show that there was insufficient evidence presented to the jury to convict or that a jury 
retrying the case will necessarily acquit the defendant Nix v Whiteside, 475 US 157, 
175 (1986), Kylesv Whitley, 514 U S 419,434-435(1995) The underlying question is 
only whether there exists a reasonable probability of a different result, and the focus is the 
reliability and fairness of the trial As the court of appeals noted, the proper standard only 
!The State also conceded that Respondent was prejudiced as to Count One by 
counsel's performance, an issue which thus is not before this Court on certiorari 
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requires that "the result of a proceeding [] be rendered unreliable, and hence the 
proceeding itself is unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome." Moore, 2009 UT App at 
t 8, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 
The State all but ignores these standards which must be applied in this case, making 
only passing reference to these core principles near the conclusion of its brief. See, POB 
21-22. Attempting to diffuse the focus of this appeal away from the proper standards to be 
applied in an ineffective assistance of counsel case, the State improperly focuses its 
argument on cases which were decided universally in other contexts. See, POB 15-16. 
The court of appeals understood that trial counsel's failures here denied Mr. Moore 
the fair trial to which he is entitled under the law. It reviewed the unique circumstances of 
the case presented at trial, including the fact that the two counts were based entirely on 
acts alleged to have occurred "in tandem." Moore, 2009 UT App at | 11. It did not hold 
that there was insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Moore, a claim not raised; instead, it 
properly analyzed whether under the facts of this case, the jury might have returned a 
different verdict had counsel pursued the fact that Lance had stated numerous times that 
the acts occurred an entire year later than alleged in the information. In fact, the court of 
appeal acknowledged the very line of cases, which the State argues the decision 
abandoned. 
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A. The Court of Appeals Did Not Make the Date an Element of the Offense. 
The State erroneously argues that the court of appeals improperly converted the 
date of the offense into an element of the crime. POB, 14-15. While noting that the court 
of appeals relied upon State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208 (1987) and State v. Distefano, 70 
Utah 586, 262 P.l 13 (1927), the State asserts that the decision ignored the impact of these 
cases. However, the State fails to address the actual facts and holdings of these cases and 
their progeny which demonstrate that the court of appeals decision was correct. 
In both of these cases, the date of the acts were within days of the time alleged in 
the information. In Distefano, the defense raised arguments to the jury about the 
differences in the complaining witness's testimony and the jury rejected these 
inconsistencies in returning its verdict. In contrast, here because of counsel's deficient 
performance, which the State concedes, the jury was never presented the relevant facts. 
Distefano would be controlling had these matters been raised to Mr. Moore's jury and a 
verdict of guilty been returned. But, of course, it is the very absence of such arguments 
through counsel's deficient performance which distinguishes this case from Distefano and 
requires reversal of the conviction under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Similarly, in Fulton, the information alleged that the offense occurred "on or about 
June 1, 1983." The defendant first claimed the prosecution did not carry its proof as there 
was insufficient evidence of the date alleged. Relying on Distefano, this Court rejected 
that sufficiency of the evidence argument holding that "when the prosecution does not 
have to prove the precise time of the offense, insufficiency of the evidence on that point is 
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not a ground upon which the verdict can be attacked." Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1213. In 
contrast, the issue here is not sufficiency of the evidence but whether there is a reasonable 
probability that a jury considering the charges in light of the facts omitted through trial 
counsel's errors might reach a different result. Given the year discrepancy and the fact the 
State expressly argued at trial that the offenses occurred in tandem, the court of appeals 
decision that this affected the outcome and created an unreliable and fair verdict should be 
affirmed.2 
The State ignores the second issue addressed in Fulton which has great significance 
in this case. The defendant claimed that the failure to provide sufficiently precise 
notification of the date of the crime denied the defendant his rights under Article I, 
sections 7 and 12 of the Utah Constitution.3 While this Court noted that "[t]he crux of 
both theories is that a criminal defendant must be sufficiently apprised of the particulars of 
the charge to be able to 'adequately prepare his defense.' [Citation omitted.]" Id. at 1214, 
2The State disregards the inclusion of the relevant time frame for the alleged acts 
in the jury instructions, including those requested by the State. Adoption of the State's 
argument would mean that the date of the offense should be omitted from jury 
instructions in all cases; yet, the State cites no case for this drastic proposition. Thus, 
while a defendant in most instances cannot base a reversal of a conviction on lack of 
sufficiency of the evidence regarding the date, a jury can certainly consider the date 
alleged during deliberations and a defendant may obtain an acquittal based on this factor. 
The court of appeals decision properly considered this issue in reaching its decision. 
3Section 7 mandates due process in criminal proceedings, and section 12 provides 
that the accused has the right to demand the nature and the cause of the accusation against 
him. 
12 
it did not address the scope of this right in Fulton because the defendant did not seek a bill 
of particulars and thus waived the notice argument. Id. at 1214-1215. 
However, trial counsel here filed a motion for a bill of particulars, in part based on 
a request "that the prosecution set forth the exact date that the prosecution intends to prove 
that the Defendant committed the act set forth in Counts 1 and 2 of the Information." (R. 
31-33.) The State responded in writing by reaffirming that the act occurred between July 
1, 2002, and August 31, 2002. The State further responded that no precise date could be 
shown within those times, because u[t]his conduct took place over four years ago when the 
victim was thirteen years old, therefore a specific date of the offense is not known. 
Section 77-14-1 of the Utah Code requires that the prosecuting attorney specify as 
particularly as is known the place, date and time of the offense charged." (R. 34-36.) 
The State fails to consider the impact of the response to the request for a bill of 
particulars. In another case relied upon by the State and decided almost seventy years ago, 
this Court held that "[w]e have repeatedly held that the allegation of time is immaterial, 
that regardless of the time alleged, except where made certain by a bill of particulars, the 
state may prove the offense at any time within the statutory period of limitations. 
[Citations omitted.]" State v. Cox, 106 Utah 253, 256, 147 P. 858, 860 (1944) [emphasis 
added]. 
This Court in McNair v. Hayward, 666 P.2d 321, 327 (1983) found that a 
seventeen-day discrepancy in the date alleged was sufficient to require reversal, even 
without a bill of particulars, and noted that "we have no doubt that a judgment of 
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conviction on this evidence would have been reversed for insufficient evidence if it had 
been appealed." In McNair, this Court wrote that "time is always an essential element of a 
crime in the sense that due process requires that an accused be given sufficiently precise 
notification of the date of the alleged crime that he can prepare his defense." Id. at 326. 
Because the date was made specific, albeit within a two month period in 2002, by 
the bill of particulars, the exception to the general rule applies here, providing another 
reason to affirm the court of appeals decision. In essence, the court did not believe that 
Mr. Moore received a fair and reliable trial to the extent that the court's confidence in the 
verdict was undermined by trial counsel's errors. This Court need not address or explain 
its holding in Cox in order to affirm the court of appeals decision; it is sufficient to find 
that the trial was not fair. Upon remand, as the court of appeals noted, the State will have 
an opportunity to decide how to charge the offense in a manner to provide adequate notice 
to the defendant and his counsel. 
Because the court of appeals decision does not conflict with this Court's precedents 
in this area, and in fact is supported by this Court's prior rulings, the decision should be 
affirmed on certiorari. 
B. A Variance Might Not Have Been Granted by the Trial Court. 
The State argues finally that the court of appeals decision held that a variance 
would not have been granted and was thus in contradiction of prior rulings of this Court. 
This argument must be rejected. 
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First, the court of appeals made no such ruling. As dicta in a footnote, the decision 
merely noted that ". . . we do not see that a variance of a year is permissible under the 
facts of this case. . . . " Moore, 2009 UT 386, at \ 10, n. 3 [emphasis added]. Thus, the 
decision of the court of appeals that Mr. Moore was prejudiced by his counsel's errors was 
not based on the variance issue. The State may have chosen not to seek a variance in the 
trial court and instead proceeded to base its prosecution on the summer of 2002; or it may 
have sought to expand the time period, or to change the date to 2003. Because defense 
counsel did not raise the issue through neglect, this Court can only measure what might 
have occurred under the standard of reasonable probability of a different result. The 
State's reliance on the law of variance is at most a red herring, leading this Court away 
from its central task in analyzing the prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel. Nor 
does the record in the trial court, either on trial or in the motion for new trial, indicate at 
any point that the State was prepared to amend the information. There is thus no evidence 
to base a decision on this ground alone. 
Second, the State argues that any variance would have been the result of evidence 
presented by the Defendant, and therefore the law of variances would not apply. 
However, the facts in support of the variance would have come solely from the State's 
complaining witness, not from any defense witnesses. None of the cases relied upon by 
the State apply to the facts of this case. In State v. Thome, 39 Utah 208, 117 P. 58 (1911), 
the State presented evidence that the murder was a first degree murder as it was committed 
during a robbery and was wilful, deliberate and premeditated. The defendant testified 
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establishing the murder was committed during a robbery, but was unintentional. Both 
theories constituted first degree murder under the statute. Given this unique set of facts, 
this Court held the defendant could not complain of any possible variance. 
Thome is not a case where possible cross-examination of a prosecution witness 
might be the basis for the need to amend the charging document, as is the case here. Nor 
do any of the other cases cited by the State stand for the proposition that mere cross-
examination of a prosecution witness bars the defense from challenging a possible motion 
to amend the information. See, POB 19. 
That the State failed to elicit the contradictory testimony from its own witness 
indicates that the State was taking advantage of trial counsel's errors in failing to cross-
examine the prosecution witness and forcing the State to its burden of proof. Yet, the 
prosecution has a responsibility different from that of the normal adversary injudicial 
proceedings. See, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). Thus, while not rising 
to a claim of prosecutorial misconduct because the evidence was provided to defense 
counsel well before trial, it would be unfair to Mr. Moore to now hold that, had his counsel 
elicited this inconsistency through impeachment of the star prosecution witness, the court 
absolutely would have permitted a variance. Moreover, the State does not indicate what 
variance it would have sought or would have been permitted - an extension of the dates to 
cover a two year period or a change to allege the year of 2003 only. It mentions in passing 
that the State "could" have moved the court to delete reference to 2002, but does not assert 
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that this is the sole or proper position the trial prosecutor would have taken in this matter. 
See, POB at 21. 
In either case, there exists a reasonable probability that a trial court would not have 
permitted any variance or that Mr. Moore would have been acquitted under any of the 
possible variances had one been granted. Having requested the bill of particulars, trial 
counsel was on notice of the 2002 date and relied upon that date in preparing the defense. 
Seeking an amendment mid-trial to reflect a change in the year charged under these 
circumstances would have violated the defendant's substantial rights as the defense was 
built around the dates alleged in the information and set forth in the response to the bill of 
particulars. The reliability of the trial would have been affected under any of these 
scenarios, and Mr. Moore is thus entitled to a new trial. 
The State's reliance on Fulton regarding the variance issue is misplaced. At trial in 
Fulton, the evidence presented by the defense showed that the acts could have occurred on 
May 31 or June 2, even if the jury accepted the defendant's alibi evidence. Since these 
dates were within one day of the date charged in the information, this Court held there was 
no fatal variance between those allegations and the proof at trial. Here, the variance, if 
one was requested, would have been for a period of an entire year, well beyond any 
variance approved by this Court. See, e.g. State v. Jamison, 161 P.2d 134 (Utah App 
1989).4 
4
"Where specificity of dates, times, or places, can be obtained, we encourage it. In 
McNair v. Hayward, 66 P.2d 321 (Utah 1983), a case involving only adult testimony, we 
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Finally, the State fails to address the prejudice that would have resulted from any 
attempt by the State to amend the date by a full year. Having sought a bill of particulars, 
trial counsel could expect that the State would abide by the two-month time period. Based 
upon the State's response to the bill of particulars, trial counsel built the defense around 
the impossibility of the acts occurring during the summer of 2002 as described by Lance. 
To support that defense, counsel's use of the witness's own prior recorded statements were 
critical. Thus, had the prosecution moved mid-trial to amend the information, there is a 
reasonable probability it would not have been granted, and in any event, Mr. Moore at 
least would have been entitled to a significant continuance to confront the prosecution's 
new position on the evidence.5 See, Fulton, 742 P.2d at 1215-1216. 
This Court has held, "an amendment to an information which expands the range of 
dates for the occurrence of an alleged offense can implicate substantial rights of a 
defendant by compromising his opportunity to present alibi evidence." State v. Nelson-
Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, Tf 20, 94 P.3d 186, citing State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 
(Utah 1985) [rejecting appeal under plain error and manifest injustice standard to an 
held that the seventeen-day disparity between the charging document and the evidence 
presented at trial exceeded the one to three days grace period generally included with the 
phrase 'on or about.' Id. at 326-27." State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 40, If 12, n. 3, 116 P.3d 
360. It must not be forgotten that Lance was an adult when he testified at trial. 
5Since the State had access to the same taped statements of Lance and did not 
move to amend prior to trial, this Court cannot assume, as the State does, that any motion 
to amend mid-trial would have been made by the State. Indeed, the record from the trial 
court on the motion for new trial does not reflect any statement that a variance would 
have been requested. (R. 559.) 
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amendment to narrow the charged date when no objection was made at trial level]. Here, 
any possible amendment would have seriously impacted Mr. Moore's substantial rights if 
the motion was made at any time during the trial, as his defense was based on the notice 
provided by the State concerning the date of the alleged offense. 
Even if some amendment had been permitted, there is a reasonable probability the 
jury would have relied on Lance's inconsistent statements to find Lance lacked credibility, 
especially in light of the change in those statements after further contact with the police in 
an unrecorded call. While the court of appeals did not find that Lance's overall credibility 
would have been sufficiently challenged by these discrepancies, this Court has long held 
that such line of cross-examination is often of critical import in testing witness credibility. 
See, e.g Fulton 742 P.2d at 1213, n. 6, [the failure to be able to establish the date of the 
offense "will almost always reduce the credibility of the prosecution's case."]. 
As the court of appeals decision recognized, what may have happened at trial had 
counsel used the inconsistent statements cannot be known with precision. That factor is 
why the standard for reversal is a reasonable probability of a different result, the very 
standard employed by the court of appeals. And that is why, upon remand, the State has 
numerous options in how it will charge and present the case to the jury. Only upon retrial 
will Mr. Moore receive the fair trial to which he is entitled. 
19 
CONCLUSION 
For these reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court affirm the decision of 
the court of appeals reversing Mr. Moore's conviction for dealing in material harmful to 
minors. 
Dated: October 27, 2010. 
Andrew Parnes 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Arvin V. Moore 
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